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Ideally, an attorney would like to represent as many clients
as possible. Yet, when an attorney represents a client in court
with interests that are conceivably adverse to a former client's
interests, he does so at his peril. He risks finding himself the
object of a disqualification motion charging him with violating
the conflict of interest provisions of the American Bar Associa-
tion's Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).1 Even
if the former client is not a party to the litigation or has con-
sented to the attorney's representation of the new client, the
attorney may still face a disqualification motion. Some courts
permit third parties (generally opposing counsel) to make dis-
qualification motions based on a conflict of interest to which
they have no personal relation.2
* Associate, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld. A.B. 1978, Brown University; J.D.,
1981, Harvard. The author wishes to thank Alan B. Morrison for his aid and criticism"
and Alice Holcomb for her help on the first draft.
1. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101 to -107 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter Code]. In 1970 the Code replaced the Canons of Professional Ethics that the Ameri-
can Bar Association had first promulgated in 1908. Since 1970, the Code has been
amended five times. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which would replace the
current Code, are presently under discussion by the ABA's Commission on Evaluation of
Professional Standards.
The Code consists of three parts: (1) the Canons are nine short general "statements
of axiomatic norms," (2) the Ethical Considerations are 138 aspirational guidelines
"toward which every member of the profession should strive," but they are not
mandatory, (3) the 41 Disciplinary Rules "state the minimal level of conduct below
which no lawyer should fall without being subject to disciplinary action." CODE, supra, at
Preliminary Statement.
Most state courts have adopted all or at least substantial portions of the Code. D.
MELLINKOFF, LAWYERS AND THE SYSTEM OF JusTIcE 637-38 (1976).
2. See, e.g., Whiting Corp. v. White Mach. Corp., 567 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1977);
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The ostensible purpose of a disqualification motion is to
expose and eliminate unethical conduct in order to protect both
the interests of the former client and the interest of the public
in the integrity of the bar.3 Motions to disqualify, however, have
become tools of the litigation process, used solely for strategic
purposes.4 As a result, they have proliferated in the federal
courts.
Federal courts are by no means blind to the strategic uses to
which disqualification motions can be put.5 In ruling on the
actual merit of disqualification motions, courts have grown
increasingly sensitive to the hardships which inure to the client
who loses his chosen counsel through disqualification.6
To curb the strategic uses and abuses of disqualification
motions, courts should look for reasons behind the proliferation
of such motions. The standing rules have received little atten-
tion in this respect. Some federal courts have allowed parties
other than the former client to make disqualification motions on
the basis of an attorney's representation of a client with inter-
ests adverse to those of a former client.7 This practice has
greatly expanded the number of litigants with standing to make
disqualification motions.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 563 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1977);
Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
3. It is the responsibility of the district courts to supervise the conduct of attorneys
who practice before them. E.g., United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 969 (8th Cir.
1982); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 445-46 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on other
grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 383
(8th Cir. 1979); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979); Whiting
Corp. v. White Mach. Corp., 567 F.2d 713, 716 (7th Cir. 1977); Richardson v. Hamilton
Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1385 (3d Cir. 1972); Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848, 859
(W.D. Mo. 1980); Price v. Admiral Ins. Co., 481 F. Supp. 374, 377 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
4. Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1980); Van Graafeiland, Lawyers
Conflict of Interest-A Judge's View, N.Y.L.J. June 20, 1977, at 1, col. 2.
5. E.g., Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1245-46 (2d Cir. 1979); Redd v.
Shell Oil Co., 518 F.2d 311, 315 (10th Cir. 1975); Williamsburg Wax Museum, Inc. v.
Historic Figures, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 326, 331 (D.D.C. 1980); Black v. Missouri, 492 F.
Supp. 848, 871 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
6. See Central Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores, 573 F.2d 988, 992 (8th
Cir. 1978); Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 609 (8th Cir. 1977); Heathcoat
v. Santa Fe Int'l Corp., 532 F. Supp. 961, 966 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Krebs v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 496 F. Supp. 40, 44 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
7. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 563 F.2d 671 (5th Cir.
1977); In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1976); Krebs v. Johns-Manville Corp., 496 F.
Supp. 40 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1980); Altschul
v. Paine Webber, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Estates Theatres, Inc. v.
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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This article will examine the issue of standing for disqualifi-
cation motions based on an attorney's representation of a client
with interests adverse to those of a former client of the attorney.
The article focuses on the appropriateness of granting standing
to nonclients to make disqualification motions, particularly
when the former client has not objected to the attorney's alleged
conflict of interest. The question of standing in this situation
cannot be disposed of merely by reference to general standing
requirements applicable to other areas of law8 because the
nature of the inquiry into a motion to disqualify is "ethical," not
"legal,"9 setting the treatment and consideration of disqualifica-
tion motions apart from that of other litigation motions. Inas-
much as far more than legal issues are involved in motions to
disqualify (such as the public's perception of the bar and the
legal system) ethical concerns must play the major role in deter-
mining who should have the right to bring the disqualification
issue to the attention of the court.
The question of who has standing to raise an issue is depen-
dent upon whose rights are to be protected.10 Therefore, since
the Code provides the source of the right, it is first necessary to
examine the Code provisions implicated when an attorney is
charged with a conflict of interest between present and former
clients to discern what rights the Code wanted to safeguard. Sec-
ond, this article will consider the standing of the former client to
8. In general, the question of standing concerns whether the litigant is entitled to
have the court decide the merits of the dispute or the particular issues. The inquiry
involves both constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction and prudential limi-
tations on its exercise. The constitutional limits on standing eliminate claims in which a
party has failed to make out a case or controversy between himself and his adversary.
See U.S. CONST. art. III. In order to satisfy Article III, the party must show that he
personally suffered "a distinct and palpable injury to himself," Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 501 (1975); that is likely to be redressed if the requested relief is granted. Simon v.
Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976).
A party who alleges sufficient injury in fact to satisfy these very minimal constitu-
tional limitations on federal court jurisdiction may nonetheless be barred from federal
court under prudential standing rules because he asserts a generalized grievance shared
in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); or because he seeks to rest his claim on the
legal rights or interests of third parties rather than his own. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 501 (1975).
9. Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 384 (8th Cir. 1979); see Devel-
opments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. Rv.
1244, 1478 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Conflicts of Interest].
10. See S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY
921-24 (1979).
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determine whose rights are being protected when he moves to
disqualify and to provide a frame of reference for the analysis of
nonclient standing. Finally, the bulk of this article will focus on
the propriety of permitting nonclients to make disqualification
motions. This article suggests that courts will provide better,
long-term protection for the interests the Code seeks to safe-
guard by curtailing the standing rights of nonclients to make
disqualification motions.
II. THE ROLE OF THE CODE IN THE DISQUALIFICATION PROCESS
The drafters of the Code designed the provisions concerning
an attorney's conflict of interest between former and present cli-
ents to: (1) foster confidence in the attorney-client relationship
by protecting the client's confidences (Canon 4) and ensuring
the attorney's undivided loyalty to his client (Canon 5), 11 (2) aid
in the maintenance of public confidence in the legal system
(Canon 9),12 and (3) provide attorneys a standard by which to
measure their professional conduct. 13 Although the Code makes
no attempt to prescribe either disciplinary procedures or penal-
ties for Code violations, 4 courts nevertheless look to it for gui-
dance and will disqualify an attorney when they find an imper-
missible violation of the Code. 15 Moreover, as set forth below,
the Code was not designed as a basis for standing to make dis-
qualification motions. However, such a result has, in fact,
occurred.
A. Canon 4
Canon 4 requires a lawyer to preserve the confidences and
secrets of a client.16 The Canon implicitly incorporates the
admonition, embodied in old Canon 6 of the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics 17 that "the [lawyer's] obligation to represent the
client with undivided fidelity and not divulge his secrets or con-
11. Canon 4 states "a lawyer should preserve the confidence and secrets of a client;"
Canon 5 states "a lawyer should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of
a client."
12. CODE, supra note 1, at Canon 9 states: "A lawyer shall avoid even the appear-
ance of professional impropriety."
13. CODE, supra note 1, at Preliminary Statement.
14. CODE, supra note 1, at Preamble.
15. Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973).
16. See supra note 11.
17. The Canons were superseded by the Code on January 1, 1970. See supra note 1.
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fidences forbids also the subsequent retainers or employment
from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the cli-
ent with respect to which confidence has been reposed."'" This
ethical duty survives the termination of the attorney-client
relationship.
Canon 4 and its accompanying Disciplinary Rules, especially
Disciplinary Rule 4-101(B), 19 are designed to allay any appre-
hension that a client may have about frank discussion of sensi-
tive information with counsel. Without strict enforcement of
such ethical standards, a client would hesitate to discuss
problems freely and extensively with his lawyer due to fear that
the information the client reveals may one day be used against
him. A lawyer's good faith efforts to follow the Code, when
standing alone, are insufficient safeguards to protect the client
from the possibility of disclosure.20 Courts have developed and
applied a strict prophylactic rule to prevent any possibility that
the attorney might violate Canon 4 by using confidential infor-
mation acquired from a former client to the former client's dis-
advantage. This rule is embodied in the "substantial relation-
ship test" first articulated by Judge Weinfeld in T.C. Theatre
Corp. v. Warner Brothers Pictures:2 1
I hold that the former client need show no more than that
the matters embraced within the pending suit wherein his for-
mer attorney appears on behalf of his adversary are substan-
tially related to the matters or cause of action wherein the
attorney previously represented him, the former client. The
Court will assume that during the course of the former repre-
sentation confidences were disclosed to the attorney bearing on
the subject matter of the representation. It will not inquire
into their nature and extent. Only in this matter can the law-
yer's duty of absolute fidelity be enforced and spirit of the rule
relating to privileged communications be maintained.2
18. Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 6 (1969) (replaced in 1970 by Model Code
of Professional Responsibility).
19. The Code states:
Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly:
1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client;
2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client;
3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of a
third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
CODE, supra note 1, at DR 4-101(B).
20. Emle Indus. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973).
21. 113 F.Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
22. Id. at 268-69.
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Thus, if the former client facing his one-time attorney in
litigation proves the existence of (1) the attorney-client relation-
ship, and (2) a substantial relationship between the content of
the two representations, a pair of presumptions arise that may
lead to the disqualification of his former attorney.2 The first
presumption is that the client disclosed confidences to the attor-
ney, which the attorney should not reveal.2 The second pre-
sumption is that the attorney shared the knowledge of the for-
mer client's confidences with all the members of his law firm.
25
This presumption can lead not only to the disqualification of the
attorney but also to the vicarious disqualification of his law firm.
B. Canon 5
Canon 5 requires a lawyer to exercise independent profes-
sional judgment on behalf of a client. Disciplinary Rule 5-10526
23. Of course, much litigation centers around the questions of whether an attorney-
client relationship ever existed and whether the two matters are actually related. For a
general discussion of the substantial relationship test, see Note, Motions to Disqualify
Counsel Representing an Interest Adverse to a Former Client, 57 TEx. L. REv. 726, 730-
34 (1976).
24. Emle Indus. Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973). Some circuits
consider this presumption to be irrebuttable, leading to automatic disqualification. Id.
Other circuits have held the presumption to be a rebuttable one. See Arkansas v. Dean
Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1979).
25. E.g., City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193,
209-10 (N.D. Ohio 1976), aff'd, 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996
(1978). See Commentary, The Disqualification Dilemma: DR 5-105(D) of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, 56 NEB. L. REv. 692 (1977).
This presumption is sometimes rebuttable. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975). But see Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind.,
Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710-11 (7th Cir. 1976) (presumption is irrebuttable).
26. CODE, supra note 1,' at DR 5-105. DR 5-105 states:
Refusing to Accept or Continue Employment if the Interests of Another
Client May Impair the Independent Professional Judgment of the Lawyer.
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his inde-
pendent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be
adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment, or if it
would be likely to involve him in representing differing interests, except to the
extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his
independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be
adversely affected by his representation of another client, or if it would be
likely to involve him in representing differing interests, except to the extent
permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(C) In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer may
represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the
interest of each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure
of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent
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contains a test for determining the propriety of an attorney rep-
resenting a client; this test in effect consists of the lawyer's anal-
ysis of whether a given representation will so influence his inde-
pendent professional judgment as to affect or to be likely to
affect the interests of another client adversely. Disciplinary Rule
5-105 strives to ensure that the attorney represents each client
with undivided loyalty. The Rule attempts to prevent an attor-
ney from getting into a position in which, even unconsciously,
the attorney will be tempted to "soft pedal" zealous representa-
tion of one client in order to avoid an obvious clash with
another.2
Courts have interpreted Canons 4 and 5 to provide the for-
mer client with the right to move for the disqualification of an
attorney who is in a position to use confidential information to
the former client's detriment. The drafters of the Code designed
these two Canons primarily to protect clients-to ensure that
clients are able to obtain the best legal representation possible
through candid discussion with their attorneys who can give
undivided and unquestionable loyalty. When a court disqualifies
a lawyer for violating Canon 4 or 5, it is the former client who is
the direct and intended beneficiary of the court order. As a
byproduct, albeit an important one, the disqualification
enhances the public's perception of the legal system through
increased confidence in the attorney-client relationship.
C. Canon 9
Unlike those of Canons 4 and 5, the broad injunction of
Canon 9 against the "appearance of professional impropriety"
professional judgment on behalf of each.
(D) If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from
employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, or associate, or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, may accept or continue such
employment.
27. Estates Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 93, 99
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). Although the current DR 5-105 does not specifically refer to the repre-
sentation of either current or former clients in the same matter, judicial opinions have
expressly or impliedly found that the drafters of the Code intended to include the former
client within DR 5-105. See, e.g., Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848, 863 (W.D. Mo.
1980); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 394 n.63 (S.D. Tex. 1969). How-
ever, Canon 5 and DR 5-105(A)-(C) have their greatest impact in situations in which the
interests of two current clients conflict. E.g., Cinema 5 Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d
1384 (2d Cir. 1976); see Code, supra note 1. The issue of conflicts between current clients
is beyond the scope of this article.
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relates to the entire spectrum of lawyer conduct" and does not
limit itself to the protection of the interests of clients alone. The
application of Canon 9 in the disqualification process has gener-
ated the most confusion and debate among courts and commen-
tators alike precisely because the maxim does not confine itself
to specific conduct or actual instances of impropriety.29 The
drafters of the Canon did not try to protect clients alone, but
intended to maintain public confidence in the legal profession
and the administration of justice by eliminating conduct that
appears to the lay person to be inconsistent with professional
integrity.30 Courts consider the preservation of public trust in
the legal system an essential goal, as important as the preserva-
tion of confidence in the attorney-client relationship. 1
A lawyer must not only be ethical but must be believed to be
so by all who come in contact with him, whether in his profes-
sional or in his private life. His interest in public service and
his position as an 'officer of the Court' require that he not only
avoid evil but the appearance of evil as well.
32
There is, however, no Disciplinary Rule in the Code which
instructs an attorney to avoid the appearance of professional
impropriety. 3 Only Canon 9 and Ethical Considerations 9-2 and
9-6 concern the appearance of professional impropriety." The
28. Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 609 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 905 (1977).
29. See ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIIJTY 400-15 (American Bar
Foundation 1979).
30. United States v. Hobson, 672 F.2d 825, 828 (11th Cir. 1982).
31. See Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1979); IBM Corp.
v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978); Whiting Corp. v. White Mach. Corp., 567 F.2d 713
(7th Cir. 1977).
32. R. WIsE, LEGAL ErHics 16 (2d ed. supp. 1979).
33. CODE, supra note 1.
34. The Code states:
EC 9-2 Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by irresponsible
or improper conduct of a lawyer. On occasion, ethical conduct of a lawyer may
appear to laymen to be unethical. In order to avoid misunderstandings and
hence to maintain confidence, a lawyer should fully and promptly inform his
client of material developments in the matters being handled for the client.
While a lawyer should guard against otherwise proper conduct that has a ten-
dency to diminish public confidence in the legal system or in the legal profes-
sion, his duty to clients or to the public should never be subordinate merely
because the full discharge of his obligation may be misunderstood or may tend
to subject him or the legal profession to criticism. When explicit ethical gui-
dance does not exist, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the
legal system and the legal profession.
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Preliminary Statement to the Code specifically states that "[t]he
Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and
represent the objectives toward which every member of the pro-
fession should strive. They constitute a body of principles upon
which the lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific situa-
tions. . . .The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considera-
tions, are mandatory in character. '35 Thus, it would seem that
an attorney could not even be disciplined for conduct which
appears improper, let alone be disqualified for it. Although
seemingly improper attorney conduct violates no Disciplinary
Rule, courts have treated Canon 9's maxim as though it were
mandatory by stating their willingness to disqualify an attorney
if his representation of a client with interests adverse to those of
a former client appears improper." In addition, in considering
motions to disqualify which allege inter alia a violation of
Canon 9, courts weigh the apparent impropriety of the conduct
in reaching their decisions.
Although judicial opinions warn that a court can disqualify
an attorney solely on the basis of Canon 9 if the conduct appears
pernicious enough, 7 courts generally disqualify attorneys in two
kinds of cases: (1) where an attorney's conflict of interest in vio-
lation of Canons 5 and 9 of the Code undermines the court's
confidence in the vigor of the attorney's representation of his
client, or, more commonly, (2) where the attorney is at least
potentially in a position to use privileged information obtained
from a former client in violation of Canons 4 and 9, thus giving
Id. at EC 9-2. The Code also states:
EC 9-6 Every lawyer owes a solemn duty to uphold the integrity and honor of
his profession; to encourage respect for the law and for the courts and the
judges thereof; to observe the Code of Professional Responsibility; to act as a
member of a learned profession, one dedicated to public service; to cooperate
with his brother lawyers in supporting the organized bar through the devoting
of his time, efforts, and financial support as his professional standing and abil-
ity reasonably permit; to conduct himself so as to reflect credit on the legal
profession and to inspire the confidence, respect, and trust of his clients and of
the public; and to strive to avoid not only professional impropriety but also the
appearance of impropriety.
Id. at EC 9-2.
35. Id. at Preliminary Statement.
36. See, e.g., IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 283 (3d Cir. 1978); Fred Weber, Inc.
v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 609 (8th Cir. 1977); Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp.,
469 F.2d 1382, 1385-86 (3d Cir. 1972); Price v. Admiral Ins. Co., 481 F. Supp. 374, 377
(E.D. Pa. 1979).
37. See cases cited supra note 36.
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his present client an unfair advantage in the litigation."8 This
observation suggests that Canon 9, standing alone, is rarely
enough support for a disqualification order. 9 Yet, because some
courts are unwilling to sanction egregiously apparent miscon-
duct, they are not ready to emasculate completely Canon 9's
possible deterrent power by declaring that it is not a sole basis
for disqualification. Thus, Canon 9 remains a ground upon
which a movant can attempt to rest a disqualification motion,
even if the court will ultimately deny the motion.
Although courts rarely, if ever, grant motions to disqualify
solely on the basis of Canon 9, they will still expend the time
and energy necessary to consider the allegations in order to
enforce a perceived purpose of the Code. Since courts have
demonstrated a willingness to entertain disqualification motions
based on Canon 9, litigants, conscious of the strategic value of
disqualification motions, have responded by filing such motions
even when they are not former clients.
Canon 9 also has a strong impact on disqualification
motions made against former government attorneys." In this
instance, a specific Disciplinary Rule, 9-101(B),,1 addresses the
potential former client conflicts that can develop when a lawyer
leaves government service and enters a private law practice. The
disqualification rules pertaining to former government attorneys
differ from the ordinary Canon 4 and 5 related rules due to the
38. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1245-46 (2d Cir. 1979). But see Gen-
eral Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974). In General Motors, a
former government attorney was disqualified because of the apparent impropriety of his
role as the city's attorney. No actual impropriety was found. Given the current judicial
attitude concerning Canon 9, it is not clear whether the case would be decided the same
way today.
39. But see In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings (City of Long Beach v. Standard
Oil Co. of Cal.), 658 F.2d 1355, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990 (1982).
In Long Beach, the court stated: "After carefully reviewing the policy considerations on
both sides, we hold that Canon 9 alone can be the basis for a disqualification
motion. ... This court will affirm such an order [of disqualification] only where the
impropriety is clear and is one that would be recognized as such by all reasonable per-
sons." Id. at 1360-61.
40. See generally Conflicts, of Interest, supra note 9, at 1413-43.
41. CODE, supra note 1, at DR 9-101(B). DR 9-101(B) states: "A lawyer shall not
accept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while
he was a public employee." The conflicts of interest which face a former government
attorney will only briefly be addressed in this paper. For a thorough discussion of the
issue, see Comment, Conflicts of Interest and the Former Government Attorney, 65
GEo. L.J. 1025 (1977); Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and the Canons of
Professional Ethics, 70 HAnv. L. Rzv. 657 (1957).
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special nature of the "former client" (the government) and the
additional policy considerations underlying the former govern-
ment attorney rules. Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B) forbids the
attorney to accept private employment in a matter in which he
had substantial responsibility while a government employee.
The policies underlying Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B) are not
only to preserve the confidences of the "former client," a policy
which receives protection from Canon 4, but also to prevent pre-
sent government attorneys from weakening the government's
position by acting in such a way as to further their chances for
later private gain.42 Also clearly behind Disciplinary Rule 9-
101(B), as evidenced by its placement in the Code under Canon
9, is the policy of maintaining public confidence in the legal pro-
fession by avoiding the apparent impropriety of a government
attorney who appears to be "switching sides. '43 The weight to be
accorded to this policy consideration is the subject of much
debate.44 As a result, the courts have not decided whether a liti-
gant can make a disqualification motion based on the apparent
impropriety of a former government attorney's subsequent
representation. 5
D. Vicarious Disqualification
Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D) 46 is of particular importance
when used as one of the bases of a motion to disqualify because
that Rule mandates the vicarious disqualification of an attor-
ney's entire law firm if the attorney must decline or withdraw
from employment under any Disciplinary Rule. Thus, if a court
disqualifies an attorney for violating Disciplinary Rule 4-101(B),
the court may also disqualify the attorney's entire law firm pur-
suant to Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D), because the Rule presumes
the attorney's partners and associates share his knowledge. The
rationale for vicarious disqualification appears in the former
Canons of Ethics: "The relations of partners in a firm are so
42. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 342 (1975).
43. Id.
44. Id.; cf. Committee on Legal Ethics, Tentative Draft Opinion for Comment:
Inquiry 19, DisTm cT LAWYER, Fall 1976, at 39 (arguing for stronger standard).
45. Compare Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (former govern-
ment attorney's law firm should not be disqualified on basis of apparent impropriety),
vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981), with Price v. Admiral Ins. Co., 481 F.
Supp. 374 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (attorney and law firm disqualified on basis of apparent
impropriety alone to support policy of DR 9-101(B)).
46. See supra note 26.
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close that the firm, and all the members thereof, are barred from
accepting any employment that any member is prohibited from
taking. '4
7
The purpose of Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D) is, of course, to
prevent the circumvention of the Code through the actions of
partners, associates, or affiliates. Vicarious disqualification theo-
retically serves to promote the interests of both the former client
and the public. The public and the former client might question
whether the disqualification of one attorney for a conflict of
interest between present and past clients eliminates the poten-
tial for the unethical use of confidential information if the attor-
ney's close associates continue the representation.
Although the logic of Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D) is plain,
some critics favor limiting its application because of the fre-
quently harsh results of vicarious disqualification, the worst of
which falls on the current client."8 Vicarious disqualification can
be a draconian measure especially when employed in conjunc-
tion with Canon 9. Indeed, some courts have attempted to limit
the instances of vicarious disqualification to situations in which
it appears necessary to protect the interest of the former client.
49
Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D) poses potential difficulties for
the former government attorney and his new law firm by expos-
ing both of them to disqualification motions. A strict interpreta-
tion of that Rule in conjunction with Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B)
would prevent virtually any law firm's participation in lawsuits
involving the government agencies for which their attorneys for-
merly worked. Strict construction of these rules would discour-
age the hiring of former government attorneys, which would in
turn deter many qualified lawyers from seeking government
employment. While some bar associations and judicial opinions
sanction waivers by government agencies of the conflicts of
interest which might otherwise lead to vicarious disqualification
so as to avoid this result,50 others have failed to embrace this
concept,51 enabling disqualification motions to be made even
47. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 33 (1931).
48. See Aronson, Conflict of Interest, 52 WASH. L. REv. 807, 851-54 (1977).
49. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581,
589 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
50. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds,
449 U.S. 1106 (1981); Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977); ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 (1975); accord Note,
The Chinese Wall Defense to Law Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 677 (1980).
51. See Price v. Admiral Ins. Co., 481 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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after the "former client" has consented to the conflict.
In examining the issue of standing, it is important always to
keep Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D) in mind. Vicarious disqualifica-
tion has far-reaching effects which the moving party can use to
his considerable advantage.
E. Summary
As this brief overview of the Code's relation to the disquali-
fication process suggests, the drafters designed the Code to pro-
tect several different interests-those of clients, both present
and former, those of attorneys, and those of the public. Since
the Code's provisions are vague and subject to varying interpre-
tations by the courts (especially Canon 9), often on a case-by-
case basis, a litigant has broad discretion to file a motion to dis-
qualify alleging a conflict of interest in violation of one or more
of the rights protected by the Code. Such a motion compels the
court to inquire into the allegations and possibly to disqualify
the opponent's attorney and even the attorney's law firm.
III. THE RIGHT OF THE FORMER CLIENT TO MOVE TO
DISQUALIFY
It is easy to understand why courts allow the former client
to make a motion to disqualify. In accord with general require-
ments of standing applicable to other areas of the law, the for-
mer client may make a motion to disqualify in order to protect
his personal interest in the attorney or his law firm not using the
former client's confidential information to his disadvantage. The
former client may suffer an injury if he cannot bring the alleged
conflict of interest to the attention of the court. If the attorney
is able to reveal the former client's confidences, then the former
client may lose the litigation. Moreover, such tactics on the part
of the attorney, an officer of the court, call into question the
integrity of the trial.
If the attorney were to use confidential information to the
detriment of the former client, the attorney would be violating
Disciplinary Rule 4-101(B), a Rule aimed specifically at the pro-
tection of clients, both present and former, from such conduct.
Since the Code strives to foster the attorney-client relationship
by encouraging uninhibited discussion between the client and
his lawyer, the former client may make a motion to disqualify in
order to vindicate his own rights which the Code intended to
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safeguard. In addition, disqualification precludes the attorney
from profiting from his own unethical actions. If the former cli-
ent could only proceed against the lawyer in a disciplinary pro-
ceeding, his interests would not be fully protected because his
immediate injury would not be avoided. Although the attorney
might face discipline if a violation of Disciplinary Rule 4-101(B)
were proved, the client might still have lost the litigation due to
the disclosure. Therefore, the federal courts assist the former cli-
ent (and, as a consequence, the attorney-client relationship) by
permitting him to make the disqualification motion and to
attempt to utilize the presumptions which follow when the sub-
stantial relationship test is met."2
When a former client (or his attorney) weighs making a dis-
qualification motion, he considers only his personal interest in
the conflict-whether potential disclosures of information would
harm him, or whether a disqualification motion would be a use-
ful litigation strategy." As a byproduct, when the former client
acts to protect himself from the disclosure of confidential infor-
mation by disqualifying his adversary's attorney, the former cli-
ent also helps to safeguard another interest protected by the
Code, the maintenance of public confidence in the legal system
through the avoidance of impropriety. In pursuing his own inter-
ests, the client exposes unethical or potentially unethical behav-
ior, enabling the court to preserve the integrity of the proceed-
ings by eliminating the offending attorney from representing a
litigant during the trial.
However, public confidence in the legal system is not likely
to be a motivating factor for a former client deciding whether to
seek to disqualify his former attorney for conflict of interest.
Even if he did consider public confidence a factor, the former
client would probably not consider it as significant as a court
would. Inasmuch as this factor will not weigh heavily in the for-
mer client's decision on a disqualification motion, he may con-
sent to the employment of his former attorney by an opposing
party in litigation, regardless of whether the subsequent repre-
sentation appears improper to some members of the public. The
client might fail to object in instances where he realizes that any
prior disclosures he may have made to the lawyer will not
52. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
53. Nonclients do not have a monopoly on frivolous disqualification motions; former
clients make them as well. See Williamsburg Wax Museum, Inc. v. Historic Figures, Inc.,
501 F. Supp. 326 (D.D.C. 1980).
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prejudice him in the new case.5
The Code, in Disciplinary Rule 4-101(B)(3), permits an
attorney to use a confidence or secret of one client for the
advantage of a third person if the client "consents after full dis-
closure.""5 Nowhere does the Code attempt to define either
"consent" or "full disclosure." The language of the Code sug-
gests that an attorney must request permission from the former
client if he wishes to reveal confidential information to or use
the information for the advantage of his current client." Once
the former client evidences some type of consent, the attorney
can reveal the information. The Code gives no indication as to
whether the consent must be express or whether it can be
implied from the client's failure to object.
The Code also does not make clear whether a former client
can consent to all potential disclosures of information, thereby
enabling the attorney to represent a subsequent client with
interests that are adverse to those of a former client.5 7 If the
former client does not consider disclosure of the information
prejudicial, then the consent does not appear troubling. How-
ever, if the client's consent is to be meaningful, the former client
must be fully apprised of all the potential consequences that
may follow from disclosure. One can question the wisdom of
allowing a former client to consent to her attorney's disclosure of
confidential information to be used for the advantage of a third
party. The client must possess enough information to make a
reasoned decision.56 Since the Code does not define "full disclo-
sure," the attorney must interpret its meaning on his own. The
potential exists for the attorney to shape his discussion with the
former client of possible outcomes of disclosure to minimize any
potential adverse effects in order to encourage consent. Indeed,
courts often assume that laymen do not fully understand or
appreciate the potential conflict when an attorney uses consent
as a defense in a subsequent representation."
54. In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litig., 530 F.2d 83, 89 (5th Cir. 1976)
(citing Consolidated Theatres v. Warner Bros. Cir. Mgmt. Corp., 216 F.2d 920, 926 (2d
Cir. 1954)); Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848, 865 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
55. See supra note 18.
56. See Dodson v. Floyd, 529 F. Supp. 1056, 1064 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
57. See Conflicts of Interest, supra note 9, at 1333-34 (1981).
58. See Dodson v. Floyd, 529 F. Supp. 1056, 1064 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
59. Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 573-74 (2d Cir. 1973); Consoli-
dated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Cir. Mgmt. Corp., 216 F.2d 920, 927-28 (2d Cir.
1954); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 400 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
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If one accords great weight to the aim of avoiding apparent
impropriety which might diminish the public's respect for the
legal system, there might be circumstances in which the former
client should not be able to consent to an adverse representation
as a matter of public policy, 0 the lack of prejudice to the former
client notwithstanding. For example, the appearance of impro-
priety might be so great that one private person's acquiescence
will not justify the negative impact on the public's perception of
the legal system. If such a situation is considered intolerable due
to its implications for the perceived integrity of the bar, then the
consent of the former client would not seem to preclude the
making of a disqualification motion by someone else in order to
bring the situation to the court's attention. Yet when parties
other than the former client have standing to make disqualifica-
tion motions on this basis, the potential for abuse is extensive.
Some courts permit only the former client to make a dis-
qualification motion"' on the rationale that "the client is what
the standards are all about."6 2 Canons 4 and 5 are certainly
aimed primarily at the protection of clients, who can choose
whether or not to waive their right to object. Other courts have
recognized that if the former client is the only party permitted
to move to disqualify, the public's interest in the integrity of the
bar and the entire judicial process embodied in the multifarious
Canon 9 might go unchampioned.3 In addition, the former cli-
ent may not always be in a position to protect his interests
completely.
The potential for such occurrences has prompted some fed-
eral courts to permit nonclients to move for the disqualification
of an attorney for representation of a client with interests
adverse to those of a former client. The fear that all of the inter-
ests safeguarded by the Code will not be protected if only the
former client has standing to move to disqualify has been the
justification for this practice, which tends to put the interests
protected by Canon 9 on the same plane or above those pro-
tected by Canons 4 and 5. This article now considers the propri-
60. See Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
61. See Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977); In re
Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litig., 530 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1976).
62. Patterson, Wanted: A New Code of Professional Responsibility, 63 A.B.A. J.
639, 642 (1977).
63. See In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1976); Empire Linotype School v.
United States, 143 F. Supp. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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ety of granting standing to nonclients to make disqualificaton
motions.
IV. STANDING FOR NONCLIENTS TO MAKE MOTIONS
A. The Rationale for Nonclient Standing
Courts have given four reasons for granting standing to non-
clients to make disqualification motions when the motions relate
to an attorney's representation of a client with interests adverse
to a former client. These grounds are: Disciplinary Rule 1-
103(A), general public policy, Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B), and
the rights of the former client.
1. Disciplinary Rule 1-103(A)
Disciplinary Rule 1-103(A), which has been adopted in some
but not all jurisdictions,"4  states: "A lawyer possessing
unprivileged knowledge of a violation of DR 1-10265 shall report
such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to
investigate or act upon such violation." Although the language of
the Rule apparently encourages attorneys to report Code viola-
tions to their bar association's disciplinary committees, some
courts have interpreted the rule to impose an ethical duty on
members of the bar to bring all ethical violations to the atten-
tion of the court.6 This interpretation implies that an attorney
who is aware of a violation of Canons 4, 5, and 9 has standing to
make a motion to disqualify based on Disciplinary Rule 1-
64. For example, the District of Columbia Code of Professional Responsibility's DR
1-103(A) reads: "A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge or evidence concerning
another lawyer or judge shall reveal fully such knowledge or evidence upon proper
request of a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon the con-
duct of lawyers or judges." District of Columbia Code of Professional Responsibility, 2
NAT'L REP. ON LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPoNsIBILIrY V2:DC3 (1982).
65. CODE, supra note 1, at DR 1-102 states:
(A) A lawyer shall not:
1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule.
2) Circumvent a Disciplinary Rule through actions of another.
3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.
4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.
5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice.
6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law.
66. E.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 563 F.2d 671, 673
(5th Cir. 1977); Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848, 861 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
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103(A) as well as a duty to report the violation to the bar associ-
ation or the court's disciplinary committee. Taken to its logical
extreme, this notion suggests that any member of the bar could
and should make a motion to disqualify in any litigation involv-
ing an attorney who may have violated the Code. Applied
pragmatically, standing grounded in Disciplinary Rule 1-103(A)
permits opposing counsel to make a disqualification motion even
when his sole interest is to harass his adversary, rather than to
purify the bar.
2. Public Policy
Permitting nonclients to make disqualification motions on
the ground of public policy rests on considerations similar to
those which support Disciplinary Rule 1-103(A). When an attor-
ney faces Code violation charges, the court must consider issues
of public importance that have implications beyond the confines
of the litigation. 7 Since district courts have the responsibility to
supervise the conduct of the attorneys who practice before
them,6 some courts consider it their duty to investigate the alle-
gations in a disqualification motion, regardless of who makes the
motion or what motivated the litigant to make it.6 9 The concern
is with purging potentially unethical conduct, not with scrutiniz-
ing the motives of the movant.7
0
Public policy considerations are also the basis for permit-
ting nonclients to make motions to disqualify for Canon 9 viola-
tions. Courts want to encourage attorneys to inform them of
apparent as well as actual impropriety in order to prevent the
proceedings from being "tainted" and to maintain public confi-
dence in the legal system.
3. Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B)
When the government is the former client, policy considera-
tions in addition to the preservation of confidences are impor-
tant to courts in determining who can make a motion to disqual-
67. E.g., Whiting Corp. v. White Mach. Corp., 567 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1977); In re
Gopman, 531 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1976); Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382
(3d Cir. 1972); Altschul v. Paine Webber, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Estates
Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
68. See supra note 3.
69. See supra note 67.
70. See Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1972).
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ify on the basis of a violation of Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B). The
policy considerations underlying that Rule are recognized to be
the following: the treachery of a government attorney's switch-
ing to work for an opposing private party, the safeguarding of
confidential government information from future use against the
government, the need to discourage government attorneys from
favoring private parties whose firms may provide the govern-
ment attorneys with future employment, and the professional
benefit derived from avoiding any appearance of evil.71 In order
to enforce these policy objectives, courts permit litigants to
make disqualification motions based on Disciplinary Rule 9-
101(B) against former government attorneys or their law firms
when the former government attorney had substantial responsi-
bility as a public servant for the matter involved in the litiga-
tion." The fact that the "former client" may have waived the
conflict is not dispositive," both because it is the movant who
might suffer direct injury due to the rule's violation, and because
of the appearance of impropriety when government attorneys
make waiver decisions on behalf of their agency when they too
may seek private employment later.7 4 For example, in Arm-
strong v. McAlpin,7 the defendant moved to disqualify a former
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) attorney's law firm
from representing the plaintiff receiver in a lawsuit similar to an
SEC enforcement action against the defendant, despite the fact
that the SEC had approved the firm's representation of the
plaintiff. No one challenged the defendant's standing to make
the motion (which the court ultimately denied).e
4. The Rights of the Former Client
When the former client is not a party to litigation or fails to
object to the attorney's subsequent representation, the nonclient
moving party can attempt to "stand in the shoes of the former
71. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 (1975).
72. See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on other
grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); Price v. Admiral Ins. Co., 481 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Pa.
1979).
73. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 461 F. Supp. 622, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated on other
grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
74. See Comment, Conflicts of Interest and the Former Government Attorney, 65
GEo. L.J. 1025, 1049 (1977).
75. 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
76. Id.
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client" and assert his rights.7 If the former client has not con-
sented to his former attorney's adverse representation, one court
has found it necessary to permit third parties to move to dis-
qualify the former client's attorney for the impermissible behav-
ior. In Estates Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures, Inc.,s the
defendant moved to disqualify the plaintiff's attorney on the
ground that his former client, who was not a party to the litiga-
tion, had not consented to the new representation. 9 Although
the former client was not the moving party, he appeared by
counsel to argue in favor of the disqualification.80 The adverse
nature of the interests was open and obvious, confronting the
courts with a clear duty to act. The court disqualified the attor-
ney.81 On the other hand, this basis of standing is not well
adapted to circumstances in which the former client has con-
sented to the subsequent representation after full disclosure by
his attorney. In In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litiga-
tion,8 2 the court refused "to allow an unauthorized surrogate to
champion the rights of the former client""3 and "use the conflict
rules for his own purposes.
'8 4
Thus, there are several bases on which third parties can
move for the disqualification of an attorney based on a conflict
of interest to which they have no personal interest at stake. 5 In
granting standing to third parties, courts have merely explained
the basis for permitting the motion to be made by a nonclient;
they have not considered the implications of the practice. The
next sections will consider both the positive and negative aspects
of nonclient standing.
B. The Potential Benefits to be Gained from Permitting
Nonclients to Make Motions to Disqualify
There are several conceivable, though speculative, benefits
that might result from third party (nonclient) motions to dis-
77. See In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litig., 530 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1976).
78. 345 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
79. Id. at 95.
80. Id. at 97.
81. Id. at 100.
82. 530 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1976).
83. Id. at 90.
84. Id.
85. The one possible exception to the general lack of personal interest involves DR
9-101(B). The former government attorney may have information obtained in his public
post not available to the opposing side. See supra text accompanying note 71.
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qualify. Most of these benefits relate to Canon 9's policy of
avoiding apparent impropriety and safeguarding the public's
interest in the integrity of the legal system through the elimina-
tion of unprofessional conduct. The less weight given to the pol-
icy behind Canon 9, the less significant these benefits become.
First, allowing nonclients to make motions to disqualify at
trial ensures that more instances of actual, potential, or arguably
unethical behavior will be brought to the attention of the courts.
By giving members of the bar essentially an incentive or reward
(i.e., using a disqualification motion as a tactical weapon) for
making the motions, courts encourage attorneys to report ethical
violations. Although Disciplinary Rule 1-103(A)'s language
appears to require attorneys to notify the appropriate tribunal
or authority of all Code violations including violations concern-
ing conflicts of interest, the Rule has met with little success,88
due to a recognized failure by members of the legal profession to
call attention to the Code violations of their fellow attorneys.8 7
Simple logic suggests that an attorney is more likely to inform
the court of another lawyer's violation of the Code if the inform-
ing attorney's client is in a position to benefit from court action
on the violation. Thus, an attorney might be willing to make a
disqualification motion on the basis of another attorney's con-
flict of interest whereas the same attorney would not be willing
to report the identical behavior to the local bar association to
institute disciplinary proceedings. As a result, if former clients
were the only parties permitted to make motions to disqualify at
trial, certain types of attorney misbehavior might continue
unchallenged because the conduct would not be reported to the
bar association.
A second benefit from granting standing to nonclients, as
well as former clients, to make motions to disqualify is that
attorneys might exercise more caution in undertaking the repre-
sentation of new clients with interests that may conflict with
those of a former client. An attorney might more fully investi-
gate potential conflict problems before agreeing to represent the
new client. If he uncovered the existence of any conflicts, he
would either decline the representation or be certain to discuss
the situation fully with the former client in order to obtain con-
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sent. This result would occur because the attorney would be cog-
nizant of the fact that his opponent in litigation would have an
incentive to unearth any conflicts of interest in order to move to
disqualify him.88 Thus, in close cases, an attorney might be less
inclined to represent a new client with interests at least arguably
adverse to those of a former client if the opposing attorney could
make a disqualification motion than if only the former client
could object. Law firms, as well as individual attorneys, might
also be more prudent in their decisions about what new clients
the firm should represent and what new attorneys (especially
former government attorneys) the firm hires. Ideally then, the
exercise of caution by lawyers and law firms would eliminate
some borderline unethical behavior that might otherwise take
place.
However, the ability of someone other than a client to make
a disqualification motion certainly does not guarantee that
courts will grant all motions filed by nonclients. In most
instances, courts have denied nonclients' motions to disqualify,"
thereby lessening any potential deterrent effect of giving non-
clients standing to make the motions. The Supreme Court's
decision in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord0 is likely to
increase denials of motions to disqualify because the motions are
no longer immediately appealable. Realizing that such motions
will not lead to their disqualification, attorneys are not likely to
moderate their behavior out of fear of disqualification motions.
Currently, attorneys are aware that disqualification motions are
frequently made and a common incident of many lawsuits. 91
Permitting nonclients to make disqualification motions in
instances in which Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B) is violated serves
to further all policies underlying the former government attor-
ney rule92 because the rule is designed not only to protect the
88. "A lawyer's adversary will often be in the best position to discover unethical
behavior." In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 265 (5th Cir. 1976).
89. E.g., Whiting Corp. v. White Mach. Corp., 567 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1977); Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 563 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1977); Black v.
Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1980); Altschul v. Paine Webber, Inc., 488 F.
Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Baglini v. Pullman, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 1060 (E.D. Pa. 1976);
cf. Richardson v. Hamilton Irttl Corp., 469 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1972) (disqualification of
former corporate attorney granted).
90. 449 U.S. 368 (1981). In that case, the Supreme Court held that denials of
motions to disqualify are not appealable orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
91. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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former client but also to deter former government attorneys
from profiting at the public's expense from their prior experi-
ence. 3 The government agency is not in a position to protect all
interests which the rule is designed to safeguard and may even
waive the conflict, although the conflict injures another party.
94
When the former client is a government agency, it may waive
the conflict in litigation in which it is not even a party.9 5 This
waiver itself might create the appearance of impropriety because
the persons granting the waiver may be exhibiting favoritism or
setting a standard that will later apply to them." Therefore,
Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B) will be enforced more often when one
who stands to be injured (the former government attorney's
opponent) can move to disqualify.
A final potential benefit of nonclients' disqualification
motions is greater attention to the public's interest in the integ-
rity of the bar and of the legal system through the elimination of
conflicts of interest and apparent impropriety. As discussed pre-
viously,9 when a former client considers whether to object to the
attorney's subsequent representation, he takes into account pri-
marily his personal interests. If he perceives no threat to these
interests and no tactical advantage to a disqualification motion,
he is not likely to protest the representation, regardless of how
improper it may appear. Since the ethical issues implicated in a
motion to disqualify are matters that have an impact on the
public as well as an effect on private individuals, it is important
that the issues receive attention and proper resolution. The per-
ceived significance of the public's confidence in the legal system
may mandate that the resolution of ethical questions ought not
to be constrained by restrictions on standing." In essence, as
one commentator has suggested, the more instances of apparent
or actual impropriety that are brought before a court for resolu-
93. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 (1975).
94. See Comment, Conflicts of Interest and the Former Government Attorney, 65
GEo. L.J. 1025 (1977).
95. E.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on other
grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); Price v. Admiral Ins. Co., 481 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Pa.
1979).
96. See supra note 74.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
98. Fordham, There are Substantial Limitations on Representation of Clients in
Litigation which are not Obvious in the Code of Professional Responsibility, 33 Bus.
LAw. 1193, 1213 (1977) (supplemental remarks).
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tion, the better the result for the legal system.9' If one accepts
this view, then an increase in the number of disqualification
motions filed by nonclients is a positive signal that the public's
interest is receiving consideration. 0 "
Thus, the increase in the number of disqualification motions
in the federal courts is the consequence of encouraging the dis-
closure of unethical or apparently improper conduct which
might serve to undermine the integrity and validity of the trial
process. This result, however, is certainly not without its serious
costs.
C. The Costs of Permitting Nonclients to Make Motions to
Disqualify
There are many costs and problems associated with permit-
ting nonclients to make motions to disqualify, especially in those
situations where the former client has not objected to the subse-
quent representation and the nonclient is basically proceeding
on a Canon 9 theory. Although the premise behind the lack of
standing requirements for motions to disqualify is the ethical
obligation of attorneys to expose all Code violations01 and real
or apparent improprieties, the widespread use of the motion
does not always serve the purpose of maintaining public confi-
dence in the legal system. There are high costs associated with
disqualification motions based on conflicts of interest especially
when the movant is seeking vicarious disqualification. These
costs are so severe that, with the exception of the case of a for-
mer government attorney, courts should impose standing
requirements.
First, if the former client does not make the motion to dis-
qualify, it is almost always the opponent who moves to disqual-
ify an attorney for representing a client with interests adverse to
those of a former client. Although courts generally do not
examine the movant's motives'02 and will investigate the charge
regardless of the reason it is brought, 03 strategic considerations
probably motivate the moving party. He is undoubtedly aware of
the burden disqualification motions place on the opposing attor-
99. Id. at 1217 (commentary by Charles Lister).
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1980); Estates Thea-
tres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).




ney and his client who must defend against the motion. The
moving attorney may employ the Code as a tactical weapon for
the advantage of his own client, clearly a use to which the Code
was not intended to be put. The manipulation of the Code for
the purpose of gaining an advantage in litigation is a practice
that itself appears improper and calls into question the moving
attorney's own ethical conduct.1 0
4
As more persons can make disqualification motions, more
motions are filed and must be handled by the courts. Regardless
of whether the motion to disqualify is meritorious or is inter-
posed purely for tactical purposes, the motion will cause delay in
the trial on the merits and considerable expense."' Once an
attorney files the disqualification motion, most courts investi-
gate the allegations in order to fulfill their duty to supervise the
conduct of the lawyers who practice before them.108 The disqual-
ification motion immediately puts the attorney or the law firm
to be disqualified on the defensive and generally diverts the
attorney's and the firm's attention from prosecuting the lawsuit
to defending his conduct. Both the attorney and his current cli-
ent must expend time and money to defeat the motion.
Delay and expense necessarily occur whenever a disqualifi-
cation motion is made, whether by the former client or a third
party. However, these effects are particularly disturbing in the
nonclient context. First, the nonclient is usually charging either
an infringement of the rights of the former client who has not
objected-to the representation or the appearance of impropriety;
the nonclient rarely charges any infringement or injury to his
own Code-protected right.10 7 In addition, the nonclient may be
seeking vicarious disqualification. 08 In other areas of the law
104. The ABA's Committee on Evaluation of Professional Standards noted this
potential for abuse in its comments to the proposed Conflict of Interest rules in the
proposed final draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFSSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7, 1.9 comments (Final Draft 1982) [hereinafter cited as
MODEL RULES]; see infra note 138.
105. The effect of the recent Supreme Court decision in Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981), on the amount of delay is yet to be seen. Certainly,
the delay involved in appeals of denials to disqualify will be eliminated. However, there
is nothing in Firestone which deters attorneys from making the motions in the first
instance.
106. See supra note 3.
107. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 563 F.2d 671 (5th
Cir. 1977); Krebs v. Johns-Manville Corp., 496 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Black v.
Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
108. Thus there exists the anomalous situation of a nonclient who was not a party to
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general standing requirements would prevent the nonclient, in
the absence of a statute giving him a right of action, from assert-
ing the rights of others when he personally has suffered no
injury."0 9  Disciplinary Rule 1-103(A) was not specifically
intended to provide a private right to make disqualification
motions, but courts have interpreted it to do so in order to facil-
itate attorneys' fulfilling their obligation to report Code viola-
tions. Although the ethical nature of the disqualification inquiry
makes general standing requirements useful only as a refer-
ence,110 such practice as nonclient standing would not be permit-
ted in other areas of the law, and this article suggests that it
should not be permitted in all circumstances in the context of
disqualification motions. Second, the effects of delay and
expense are especially disturbing in the nonclient situation
because it is apparent that although the nonclient has no imme-
diate personal interest at stake,"' he will benefit from the delay
and expense whether the court grants or denies the motion. If
his concern were really to fulfill his Disciplinary Rule 1-103(A)
obligation, he could always do so by instituting disciplinary
proceedings.
Another cost associated with permitting nonclients to make
disqualification motions is the potential loss to the current cli-
ent. As the number of disqualification motions increases, so do
an attorney's chances of being disqualified. A disqualification
motion is intended to be a sanction for an attorney's violation of
the Code but it is not only the attorney who suffers an injury,
his current client suffers also. When a court disqualifies an
attorney, he and his firm lose business. Inasmuch as disqualifica-
tion motions have become so common, the disqualification of an
attorney or his law firm probably does relatively little to taint
their reputations. In most instances, the attorney has other cli-
ents to represent. On the other hand, the current client suffers a
direct injury." '
If a court disqualifies the attorney, it also immediately sepa-
the conflict seeking the disqualificaton of an attorney who himself was not a party to the
actual conflict.
109. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
110. Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 384 (8th Cir. 1979).
111. In the case of a former government attorney, there may be a personal stake for
all clients or members of the public. See CODE, supra note 1, at DR 9-101(B).
112. For an overview of the practical effects of motions to disqualify, see Attorney
Disqualification Motions, PRAC. LAW. 11 (Oct. 15, 1980).
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rates the client from counsel of his choice.11 The attorney may
have represented the client for a number of years and the two
may have had a close working relationship.11 4 The client must
obtain new counsel, a formidable task if the litigation is complex
or specialized.""' The client will also incur the expense of edu-
cating new counsel. 1 6 This cost includes not only legal fees but
also time lost to the client instructing the new attorneys about
the litigation. In a complex case, the task of repeating factual
and legal analyses can be extremely time-consuming.""
Although the motion to disqualify attempts to maintain the
integrity of the bar, the direct beneficiary of the motion is the
movant, while the real loser is the disqualified attorney's client.
Although this result is tolerable if the former client has demon-
strated that the attorney was in a position to violate confidences
protected by Canon 4, it is less justifiable when a nonclient has
convinced the court that the conflict might appear improper to
some cynical member of the public, even though the former cli-
ent has not objected. The current client's loss is tangible; the
public's gain, if any, is impossible to measure; the nonclient's
benefit is clear.
Another cost of permitting nonclients to make disqualifica-
tion motions is that an appearance of impropriety results from
the very making of the motion, which infringes on other inter-
ests of the public. The public has an interest not only in the
maintenance of the integrity of the bar but also in the fairness
and efficiency of the judicial process. 8 As one court noted 1 9
when denying a motion to disqualify made by a nonclient,
more damage would arise if the perception were created that a
party to the litigation could be denied the counsel of his or her
choice due to counsel's prior representation of a client which is
not a party to the action at issue [and] which has not been
demonstrated to have an adverse interest to the present
client.120
113. Heathcoat v. Santa Fe Int'l Corp., 532 F. Supp. 961, 966 (E.D. Ark. 1982);
Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848, 871 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
114. See IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978); Black v. Missouri, 492 F.
Supp. 848, 871 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
115. See Attorney Disqualification Motions, PRAc. LAW. 11, 13-15 (Oct. 15, 1980).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1245-46 (2d Cir. 1979).
119. Krebs v. Johns-Manville Corp., 496 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
120. Id. at 44.
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While courts are paying more attention to the public's interest
in the administration of justice when considering disqualification
motions based on allegations of an appearance of impropriety,12" '
they have not considered this factor in determining who should
have the right to file the motions. The prevalence of disqualifica-
tion motions exacerbates public dissatisfaction with the slowness
of the civil litigation process,"2 particularly when these litigants
have no personal stake in the conflicts of interest they allege.
A large part of the problem with the entire disqualification
process is determining what role, if any, Canon 9 should play.1
23
If Canon 9 is "simply too slender a reed on which to rest a dis-
qualification order,"" 4 then movants should not be permitted to
make motions to disqualify on that basis. As long as courts state
their willingness to disqualify attorneys solely on the basis of
Canon 9, they invite nonclients to bring examples of apparent
impropriety to their attention. Since apparent impropriety is in
the "eye of the beholder" it is easy to make a disqualification
motion on this basis. The delay, harassment, and expense which
result from disqualification motions, particularly those filed by
nonclients, outweigh any potential gain from the avoidance of
apparent impropriety. Another part of the problem is the lack of
guidance for attorneys who want to know how to conduct their
professional behavior without running afoul of Canon 9. No
mechanism exists by which attorneys can learn in advance what
actions not clearly proscribed by the Code are improper. The
unsettled nature of the law on disqualification contributes to the
number of motions made.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE TO STANDING FOR NONCLIENTS TO MAKE
DISQUALIFICATION MOTIONS: A RESTRAINED APPROACH
As the preceding section demonstrates, the current practice
of nonclient standing to make disqualification motions based on
Canon 9 or the former client's rights invites abuse and accentu-
ates all the problems of delay and harassment which have
resulted from the current popularity of the use of disqualifica-
121. E.g., Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1245-46 (2d Cir. 1979); Krebs v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 496 F. Supp. 40, 44 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Black v. Missouri, 492 F.
Supp. 848, 861-62 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
122. See Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1245-46 (2d Cir. 1979).
123. For a summary of the confusion of courts over the role of Canon 9, see ANNO-
TATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 400-15 (American Bar Foundation 1979).
124. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1245 (2d Cir. 1979).
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tion motions as tools of litigation. Nonclient standing does little
to further the aims of the Code, the protection of the former
client and the maintenance of public confidence in the legal sys-
tem. Instead, it encourages litigants to bombard the federal
courts with motions to disqualify.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has recently adopted a
"restrained approach" in dealing with the merits of motions to
disqualify, first articulating it in Board of Education v.
Nyquist1 2 5 and then reiterating it in Armstrong v. McAlpin.12 '
Weighing the needs of efficient judicial administration against
the potential advantage of immediate preventive measures, we
believe that unless an attorney's conduct tends to "taint the
trial" by [violating Canon 4 or 5] courts should be quite hesi-
tant to disqualify an attorney. Given the availability of both
federal and state comprehensive disciplinary machinery, there
is usually no need to deal with all other kinds of ethical viola-
tions in the very litigation in which they surface.1 2
The Nyquist court indicated that it will no longer disqualify an
attorney on the basis of Canon 9 alone,128 stating that disqualifi-
cation was only warranted at trial in instances where Canon 4 or
5 was violated 129 thereby tainting the trial. Canons 4 and 5 pro-
tect the clients, the parties who will be directly injured if the
canons are violated.
Although Nyquist was directed at the determination of the
merits of a motion to disqualify, the court's analysis is applica-
ble to the standing question. Courts should take the restrained
approach of Nyquist a step further by limiting standing to make
a motion to disqualify to former clients with interests adverse to
the attorney's new client and to opponents of former govern-
ment attorneys. Further, the grounds for a disqualification
motion should not rest solely on allegations of apparent impro-
priety. Courts will further the aims of the Code by only consid-
ering disqualification motions based on the policies underlying
Canons 4 and 5, and Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B).
The right to enforce the policies embodied in Canons 4 and
5 belongs only to the former client. The Canon's drafters
125. 590 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979).
126. 625 F.2d 433, 445 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106
(1981).
127. 590 F.2d at 1245-46.
128. Id. at 1245.
129. Id. at 1245-46.
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designed the rules specifically for the former client's protec-
tion,130 and he is in the best position to enforce them. He is the
one most likely to know whether a subsequent representation
will injure him. Disqualification motions are intended to safe-
guard the former client's interests. The former client is free to
take advantage of their strategic value if he can satisfy the sub-
stantial relationship test. 31 Inasmuch as disqualification from
subsequent representation is for the protection of the former cli-
ent,132 courts should allow him to waive the protection and con-
sent to the adverse representation.3 3 However, a waiver should
be effective only if there is adequate disclosure of all the circum-
stances, including the lawyer's intended role on behalf of the
new client.3 4
When the former client is a government agency, the waiver
of the conflict of interest should not preclude parties in litiga-
tion against the former government attorney from moving for
disqualification. Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B) is not intended
solely to protect the former client but also to prevent the former
government attorney from profiting at the expense of the public
by using his government position to enhance his opportunities
for private employment. "' The former government attorney is
not permitted to use special knowledge he gained while in gov-
ernment employ on behalf of a private law firm against an
adversary in litigation which meets the test of Discliplinary Rule
9-101(B). Therefore, these different policy considerations justify
the former government attorney's adversary moving to disqual-
ify him or his law firm to enforce that Rule even when the gov-
ernment agency has waived the conflict.
Disciplinary Rule 1-103(A), however, should not be read to
grant standing to nonclients to make disqualification motions.
This practice is an inappropriate method for courts to encourage
attorneys to inform them of ethical violations. Lawyers' failure
to report violations of the Code by their fellow attorneys to dis-
ciplinary authorities s cannot serve to justify permitting non-
130. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
131. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
132. See MODEL RULES, supra note 104, at Rule 1.9 comment.
133. Id.
134. Id. at Rule 1.10 comment.
135. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342
(1975).




clients to be rewarded for fulfilling an ethical obligation which is
ostensibly mandatory. The final draft of the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct, which would replace Disciplinary Rule 1-
103(A),1 11 alters its language and serves to make the point that
an attorney's duty is to report serious ethical violations to the
appropriate disciplinary authorities. The drafters of the Model
Rules suggest that they are not a basis for standing in collateral
proceedings.
138
Canon 9 alone should not be a basis for anyone to have
standing to make a motion to disqualify. 39 It has been "used
promiscuously as a convenient tool for [the making of] disquali-
fication motions when the facts simply do not fit within the
rubric of other specific ethical and disciplinary rules,"14 0 and has
served to encourage the making of disqualification motions. This
practice has had negative effects. As one court noted, "[tihe
danger of damage to public confidence in the legal system would
be great if we were to allow unfounded charges of impropriety to
form the sole basis for .. .disqualification.""'
VI. CONCLUSION
The public's interest in the integrity of the legal system will
not be ignored by permitting only former clients to make dis-
qualification motions. A restrained approach to all aspects of
disqualification motions will serve to increase the fairness and
137. MODEL RULES, supra note 104, at Rule 8.3 states:
A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of
the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall
inform the appropriate professional authority.
138. MODEL RULES, supra note 104, at Preamble states:
[T]he purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by oppos-
ing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a
lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration
of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral
proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule.
Moreover, in their notes to Model Rule 1.7, the drafters state: "Ordinarily, a party whose
interests are unaffected by an asserted conflict has no standing to urge disqualification of
opposing counsel." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 notes (Proposed
Final Draft 1981).
139. Rule 1.9 does not employ the appearance of impropriety formula of Canon 9.
See MODEL RULES, supra note 104, at Rule 1.9 comment.
140. International Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1295 (2d Cir. 1975).
141. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581, 589
(E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433
(2d Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
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efficiency of the judicial process, two important components of
public confidence in the legal system. Moreover, all lawyers can
fulfill their responsibility to the public more effectively by
reporting instances of unethical or improper conduct to the
appropriate disciplinary authority rather than by making dis-
qualification motions based on conflicts of interest which do not
personally affect them or their clients. If the heart of the ethical
problem is really the failure of lawyers to regulate their profes-
sion by voluntarily informing their bar associations of unprofes-
sional conduct, then the solution lies in a reformulation of Disci-
plinary Rule 1-103(A) and lawyers' attitudes toward what the
rule represents, not by manipulation of the disqualification pro-
cess by lawyers with no genuine interest in the former client or
in public confidence in the legal system. The elimination of
these manipulative practices will ultimately do more to enhance
the public perception of the legal system than any tangential
benefits of the current system.
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